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Abstract
We study whether employment prospects of old and young workers
diﬀer after a plant closure. Using Austrian administrative data, we
show that old and young workers face similar displacement costs in
terms of employment in the long-run, but old workers lose consider-
ably more initially and gain later. We interpret these findings using a
search model with retirement as an absorbing state, that we calibrate
to match the observed patterns. Our finding is that the dynamics
of relative employment losses of old versus young workers after a dis-
placement are mainly explained by diﬀerent opportunities of transition
into retirement. In contrast, diﬀerences in layoﬀ rates and job oﬀer
arrival rates cannot explain these patterns. Our results support the
idea that retirement incentives, more than weak labor demand, are
responsible for the low employment rates of older workers.
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1 Introduction
The employment prospects of older workers who lose their job are the ob-
ject of a hot debate in Europe. Grim anecdotal evidence is often brought
to the attention of the public opinion with the goal of invoking special pub-
lic assistance for an increasingly older working population, supposedly in
need.1 But precise evidence on the real dimension of the problem, based on
representative data, is missing.
The first goal of this paper is to provide such evidence to inform the
existing debate on a more solid base. Using Austrian Social Security data,
we study the short- and long-term employment losses of “young” and “old”
workers who got displaced because of a plant closure. Employment losses
are calculated by comparing subsequent employment histories of displaced
workers to otherwise similar workers (of the same age) who did not experience
a displacement in the same period. We show that over the long-term (10-
year period) employment losses of displaced old workers are equally large
as the corresponding losses of the displaced young workers. However, the
dynamic patterns of these employment losses diﬀer strongly between the old
and the young. Immediately after a plant closure, employment losses of
displaced old workers are considerably higher, but later on those of the old
fade away while those of the young persist. Hence, the substantially higher
initial employment losses among the old contrast with substantially lower
employment losses later on.
The second goal of our paper is to interpret our empirical findings – the
diﬀerential dynamics of employment losses – in terms of a standard job search
model. In this model, workers do not only move between employment and
1 See, for example, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/robert-
chesshyre-too-old-to-work-but-too-young-to-retire-ndash-a-21stcentury-dilemma-
2011031.html or http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/9226324/Too-young-to-retire-
too-old-to-keep-the-job.html. In Italy the recent pension reform of the Monti Government
has re-ignited the public opinion debate because of the so called “Esodati” problem.
These are workers who lost their pension rights because of the reform, while being very
close to reaching the requirements that would have allowed them to retire. For some
descriptive evidence on the employability of older workers across European countries see
Leombruni and Villosio (2005).
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unemployment but have also the option to withdraw from the labor force
(retirement, disability, or other forms of non-employment). Withdrawing
from the workforce (which we label as “early retirement”) is modeled as an
absorbing state. The oﬀer of early retirement options to displaced workers
is a special feature of many European labor markets, used by governments
to mitigate economic hardships for older workers in the course of industrial
restructuring, adverse local labor market shocks or during recessions. We
argue that considering the early retirement option is crucial to rationalize the
diﬀerential employment losses of old and young displaced workers. Our model
generates diﬀerential employment histories for displaced and non-displaced
workers, based on the primitive parameters of our job search model: the exit
rate from unemployment, the job oﬀer arrival rate, the rate at which workers
withdraw permanently from the labor market. We calibrate the parameters
of this model by searching for those parameter configurations that minimize
the diﬀerences between the employment patterns generated by the model and
those observed in the data.
The parameters generated by this “minimum distance” procedure perform
remarkably well in replicating the time series of employment patterns of
displaced and non-displaced workers, both for young and for old workers. We
use these parameters to understand the relative importance of labor supply
and labor demand factors underlying the observed employment patterns.
Our analysis strongly suggests that higher inflows into early retirement
of older but still potentially active workers (both from employment and from
unemployment) explain the diﬀerential dynamics of employment losses after
a plant closure. In contrast, the calibrated age-diﬀerences in unemployment
entry and exit rates cannot explain these dynamic patterns. This suggests
that retirement incentives (for both workers and firms) rather than high
transitions into unemployment and low job-finding rates are the main driv-
ing force behind age-specific employment patterns. Old workers do neither
face a higher probability of layoﬀs if employed, nor a lower arrival rate of job
oﬀers if unemployed. They instead face a higher probability of a transition to
early retirement, in particular if they are unemployed. We also provide inde-
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pendent evidence from the Austrian Micro Census that further suggests that
search intensity for new working opportunities is significantly lower among
older unemployed workers, probably because for them the exogenous arrival
rate of new job oﬀers is relatively higher and the opportunities of early re-
tirement are more attractive.2
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the Austrian data and the
matching strategy in Section 2, while the corresponding empirical evidence is
presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we present the basic search framework,
introduce the minimum distance procedure, and discuss the relative impor-
tance of labor demand and labor supply factors as the driving force behind
the observed diﬀerences in employment experiences between young and old
workers. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and matching strategy
To assess the employment prospects of old and young workers after a displace-
ment, we use administrative employment records from the Austrian Social
Security Database (ASSD). As workers involved in a plant closure might not
necessarily be a random sample of workers, we first employ a strategy of
exact matching to make treated and controls equal along some measurable
characteristics, then we use (personal fixed eﬀects) regressions to control for
other unmeasurable confounders.
The data set includes the universe of private sector workers in Austria
covered by the social security system. All employment records can be linked
to the establishment in which the worker is employed. The period of obser-
vation covers the years from 1978 to 1998. Daily employment and monthly
earnings information is very reliable, because social security tax payments for
firms as well as benefits for workers hinge on these data.3 Monthly earnings
are top-coded, which applies to approximately 10% of workers. We trans-
2See Saint-Paul (2009) and Behaghel et al. (2008) for a more general discussion of the
role of public policies in aggravating the employment problems of elderly workers.
3See Zweimu¨ller et al. (2009) for a description of the data set.
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formed monthly gross earnings in daily wages by dividing them by eﬀective
employment duration in each month of observation.
We concentrate on all workers employed in the period 1982 to 1988, who
are therefore at risk of a firm4 breakdown in this period; this allows us to
observe the workers in detail for 4 years prior to potential bankruptcy and
for 10 years afterwards. We exclude firms from the construction and tourism
industries, because in these sectors seasonal unemployment is very high and
firms often close down out of season to reopen after several months with the
same workforce. Moreover, we restrict ourselves to workers coming from firms
with more than 5 employees at least once during the period 1982 to 1988 and
having at least one year of tenure at their firm. To study the aging process
we compare two cohorts: those of age 35 to 44 at the time of displacement –
the “young” - and those between 45 and 55 – the “old”.5
Each establishment has an employer social security number. Hence, an
exit of an establishment in the data occurs when the employer identifier ceases
to exist. However, some of these cases are not true firm exits, and (most of
the) employees continue under a new identifier, for example because of a
takeover in a family business or other similar reasons. If more than 50% of
the employees continue under a new employer identification number we do
not consider this a failure of the establishment.6
This selection procedure identifies 12,102 workers involved in plant clo-
sures between 1982 and 1988, which we compare with workers from all firms
not going bust between 1982 and 1988, with the same tenure, industry and
age requirements as the displaced workers; this second group consists of
1,087,705 workers.7 Our data set is ideal for matching. We have quarterly in-
4Although establishments, and not firms, are our units of observation for the iden-
tification of plant closures, we will use interchangeably these words for simplicity and
convenience.
5This distinction is somehow arbitrary and meant to simplify the analysis. It is reas-
suring that a specification with more but narrower age groups confirms the general pattern
of our main result; See Table 4 in Ichino et al. (2007). More detailed evidence on this
diﬀerent specification is available from the authors.
6Workers from such firms are coded as “ambiguous” and are neither in the treatment
nor the control group.
7In this analysis we limit the definition of displaced workers to workers employed in a
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formation for all workers over the four years before plant closure and have the
universe of Austrian workers available as a potential control group. Detailed
past work histories, i.e. employment record and earnings, can be considered
an almost suﬃcient statistic for the set of unobservable characteristics of
workers (see for example Card and Sullivan, 1988).
Our matching procedure is therefore very simple: we perform exact match-
ing between the displaced and non-displaced subjects on the following cri-
teria: sex, age, broad occupation (blue- or white-collar), location of firm (9
provinces), industry (30 industries), employment history in each of the quar-
ters 4, 5, 6 and 7 before plant closure.8 We do almost exact matching on
continuous variables such as: average daily wages in the quarters 8, 9, 10
and 11 before plant closure, that are matched by decile group9, and firm size
in the two years before plant closure, that is matched by quartile groups.
Thus, for each treated subject, our matching algorithm has to find a control
subject with identical characteristics (according to the list mentioned above)
at the date of plant closure. Applying this matching procedure we are able
to identify at least one control subject for 6,630 treated subjects (out of a
total of 12,102 subjects in the plant closure sample).10 In total we end up
with 36,677 matched controls. In the analysis, we compare results obtained
for this matched sample with results obtained for a sample that contains
all 12,102 treated workers and 3 randomly selected controls for each treated
worker. We will refer to this sample as the “random control” sample.11
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics about the quality of the match-
ing. While in the random control sample within-cohort diﬀerences in average
closing plant at the period of closure. Schwerdt (2011) shows that neglecting early leavers
can seriously bias estimates for costs of displacement. However, our estimate for the triple-
diﬀerence parameter is qualitatively unaﬀected by the inclusion of early leavers. See Table
6 in Ichino et al. (2007).
8Note that we use only persons with tenure longer than one year in the current firm.
9We do not want to match earnings too close to firm failure, because there might be
some anticipatory wage eﬀects of firm breakdown.
10We experimented also with less restrictive matching algorithms that increase the num-
ber of matches without major quantitative changes in the results.
11Computational constraints prevent us from running our econometric analysis using all
the potential controls in the “random control” sample.
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characteristics between displaced and non-displaced workers are substantial,
these diﬀerences (almost) disappear in the matched sample. This is true, by
construction, for the exact-matching variables: i.e. gender, blue-collar status
and age. Other variables such as tenure and work experience (only available
since 1972) were not among the matching variables in our algorithm. It is
therefore reassuring to see, that our matching strategy works perfectly in
terms of tenure and work experience: mean diﬀerences between treated and
controls are only marginal. Only in terms of plant size diﬀerences are slightly
larger for young workers, but the gap is again very small for old workers.
As for (pre-displacement) daily wages, which have been matched by deciles
in the quarters 8 to 11 prior to plant closure, the gap between the means of
matched treated and control workers is very small. Figure 1 shows that
this small gap in means does not hide large individual diﬀerences between
each treated and his/her set of controls: the kernel density estimate of this
“within match” diﬀerence in the quarters -8 to -11 shows that for both old
and young workers, most of the density is in the region between plus and
minus a quarter of a percent. The quality of the match in terms of wages is
therefore very good for both young and old.
Finally, as far as pre-displacement wage levels are concerned, it is impor-
tant for our analysis to emphasize that while in the random control sample
there are diﬀerences between displaced and non-displaced workers within
each cohort (which are eliminated by our matching strategy), there are es-
sentially no diﬀerences between age cohorts. Before plant closure the old and
the young earn approximately the same amount in both displacement groups
and thus overall. This lack of cohort eﬀects on earnings is not suprising if
we think that the relationship between age and earnings in a crossection is
typically hump-shaped with a maximum around age 45. This evidence justi-
fies the assumptions about wages that we will make in the theoretical model
described in Section 4.
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3 Age and post-displacement labor market
outcomes
3.1 The overall long run eﬀect
In order to obtain a preliminary image of the eﬀect of aging on the employ-
ment rates12 of young and old workers before and after potential displace-
ment, we divide the sample in two groups defined by the binary variable:
OLDi =
1 if a ∈ [45, 55],0 if a ∈ [35, 44]. (1)
In this way we concentrate our analysis on the comparison of the employ-
ment and earnings prospects of older relative to prime-age workers in the
displacement and non-displacement groups.
We then estimate the following linear probability model:
Yi,t = Θ(OLDi ∗ PCi ∗ POSTi,t) + β(OLDi ∗ POSTi,t) (2)
+ γ(PCi ∗ POSTi,t) + δPOSTi,t + κi + τt + ￿i,t.
where Yi,t is the binary employment status (employed or not employed) of
worker i in calendar time t measured in quarters; PCi is a dummy taking
value 1 if i is displaced in a plant closure; POSTi,t is a dummy taking value
1 if quarter t is after plant closure; κi is an individual fixed eﬀect, τt captures
calendar time eﬀects and ￿i,t captures unobservables of i at quarter t and
Θ, β, γ, δ are the parameters that we would like to estimate.
Our results in Table 2 show that there is a large plant closure eﬀect: on
average over ten years after plant closure males lose 14 percentage points
in employment rates and females lose almost 17 percentage points. These
high non-employment rates over such a long time are large in comparison
12While European studies on displacement eﬀects are typically focused on employment,
perhaps given the well known wage rigidities in the old continent, U.S. studies look typi-
cally at wage impacts of displacement or plant closure, e.g. Jacobson et al. (1993), Ruhm
(1991) or Stevens (1997). Also in this paper the primary focus is on employment, but we
will briefely discuss below some evidence on wages as well.
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with those estimated for other OECD countries (see, for example, Kuhn
(2002), Chan and Stevens (2001), Fallick (1996), Schmieder et al. (2009)).
Moreover the old non-displaced of both genders experience on average lower
employment rates than the young. But contrary to some expectations, there
are no diﬀerential eﬀects for elderly workers in case of displacement. The
triple diﬀerence – giving us the additional plant closure eﬀect for elderly
workers – is exactly zero, both for men and women.13
These overall long run eﬀects may hide more complex temporal patterns
according to distance from displacement. We now explore these patterns in
turn.
3.2 Outcomes at diﬀerent distances from displacement
To explore the eﬀects of the interaction between age and displacement at
diﬀerent distances from plant closure we expand the previous simple linear
probability model (2) in the following way :
Yi,t =
40￿
d=−16
Θd(OLDi ∗ PCi ∗Qdi,t) +
40￿
d=−16
βd(OLDi ∗Qdi,t) (3)
+
40￿
d=−16
γd(PCi ∗Qdi,t) +
40￿
d=−16
δdQ
d
i,t + τt + ￿i,t.
where d is the distance in quarters from potential or actual plant closure,
which ranges in the data from −16 to 40 with 0 denoting the last quarter
before plant closure; Qdi,t is a dummy taking value 1 if i is observed in quarter
t at a distance of d quarters from plant closure; ￿i,t captures unobservables
of i at quarter t and Θd, βd, γd, δd and the calendar time eﬀects τt are the
parameters that we would like to estimate. The other variables are defined
as in equation (2).
This specification makes clear the nature of our identification assumption.
The counterfactual of the displaced workers, at any age, are the non-displaced
workers. The eﬀect of being displaced at an older age as opposed to a younger
13Kuhn (2002), for most of the countries compared in his study, finds a higher joblessness
for elderly workers, but a lower incidence of displacement.
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age is identified by how the diﬀerence of the employment profiles of displaced
and non-displaced changes with age.
Figure 2 presents a graphical picture of these age diﬀerences. Panels A
and B of the figure report, respectively, for the young and the old, the average
employment rates of the displaced and non-displaced workers as a function
of the distance from plant closure d, defined as follows using equation 3:
E(Yi,t | OLDi = 0, PCi = 0, Qdi,t = 1) = δd
E(Yi,t | OLDi = 0, PCi = 1, Qdi,t = 1) = δd + γd
E(Yi,t | OLDi = 1, PCi = 0, Qdi,t = 1) = δd + βd
E(Yi,t | OLDi = 1, PCi = 1, Qdi,t = 1) = δd + βd + γd +Θd.
By construction, the employment rates of both the matched displaced
and non-displaced observations are equal to unity in the four quarters im-
mediately prior to the plant closure date. The employment rates at earlier
dates show that our matching procedure works perfectly as measured by the
level of the outcome variable prior to plant closure. Indeed, both for the
young and for the old, employment rates are identical also in the three years
preceding the last before plant closure (actual or potential). After the plant
closure date, instead, the employment rates of displaced and non-displaced
workers diverge sharply for both the old and the young. Note that the rate of
non-displaced workers decreases smoothly in both age groups, and particu-
larly among the old. This reflects the dissolution of employment relationships
that existed at the sampling date (i.e. the potential plant closure date) for
non-displaced workers and that later dissolved because these workers got ei-
ther unemployed or sick, retired, died, or dropped out of the labor force for
other reasons.
Panel C of Figure 2 plots the within-age-group diﬀerence between the
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employment rates of the displaced and the non-displaced
E(Yi,t | OLDi = 0, PCi = 1, Qdi,t = 1)−E(Yi,t | OLDi = 0, PCi = 0, Qdi,t = 1)
= γd
E(Yi,t | OLDi = 1, PCi = 1, Qdi,t = 1)−E(Yi,t | OLDi = 1, PCi = 0, Qdi,t = 1)
= γd +Θd.
The employment loss for the old displaced with respect to the non-
displaced is initially larger (in absolute value) than the corresponding loss of
the young, but approximately five years after displacement the ordering of
two losses becomes the opposite: the old lose less with respect to their specific
counterfactual. The empirical counterpart of this diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences,
Θd, is plotted in Panel D of Figure 2.
These estimates show that during the first five-year interval after plant
closure the old suﬀer more severely than the young: the drop in employment
rates of older displaced workers is significantly higher than the one of young
displaced workers during the first 20 quarters. But, interestingly, the picture
is turned on its head during the second five-year interval after the plant
closure date. Here we observe a significantly smaller drop in employment
rates for the old displaced workers than for the young displaced (relative to
the never displaced in the corresponding cohorts).
Another way to state this fact is that while in the case of the young the
employment rate decreases in an approximately parallel fashion for displaced
and non-displaced workers, in the case of the old it decreases much faster
for the non-displaced. The displacement, which occurred many years before,
appears to be the only reason why the labor supply behavior of the old diﬀers
from that of the young, with respect to what would have happened in both
age groups without displacement.
To complement the analysis of the employment consequences of a plant
closure, we briefly look at earnings. Figure 3 reports results based on the
same equation 3 in which Yi,t now denotes the wage (nominal daily earnings
for employed workers). A look at Panels A and B shows qualitatively very
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similar eﬀects across age groups. The first quarter after the plant closure
indicates higher earnings due to selectivity. These workers are not only suc-
cessful in searching for a new job, they are also the highly productive ones.
From the third quarter after plant closure onwards also the less productive
workers are back at work and daily earnings of displaced workers are lower
than those of the non-displaced. This gap is increasing over time. Panel D of
Figure 3 shows that earnings losses of prime-age workers are almost identical
to those of older workers, except for the very last quarter 40. Note that also
the pre-displacement wages of the young and the old are very similar, as
shown in Table 1. So, both before and after displacement, we do not observe
large earning diﬀerences between the young and old.
In sum, Figures 2 and 3 uncover temporal patterns for the employment
rates of displaced and non-displaced workers in diﬀerent age cohorts that
need to be understood in the light of a theoretical model, in order to dis-
criminate between possible explanations. However, since earning levels and
losses appear to be essentially identical for young and old workers, the model
that we will propose will take into account this evidence. We will come back
to this issue in Section 4.
3.3 Controlling for pre-displacement heterogeneity
Figure 2 does not control for potential pre-displacement diﬀerences between
displaced and non-displaced workers that remain after applying the exact
matching algorithm. In order to do this we first modify equation 3 pooling
over five consecutive two-years periods after plant closure denoted by a set of
five dummies, Y EAR(l, l+1), where l refers to the year relative to potential
plant closure with l ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, 9}.
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Using these dummies we run a regression of the form
Yi,t =
￿
l
Θl(OLDi ∗ PCi ∗ Y EAR(l, l + 1)i,t)
+
￿
l
βl(OLDi ∗ Y EAR(l, l + 1)i,t) +
￿
l
γl(PCi ∗ Y EAR(l, l + 1)i,t)
+
￿
l
δlY EAR(l, l + 1)i,t + κi + τt + ￿i,t (4)
where κi is a worker fixed eﬀects that controls for all pre-displacement and
time invariant workers’ characteristics.14
The interesting coeﬃcients to be estimated in this regression are again the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence parameters Θl. These parameters describe the tem-
poral evolution of the diﬀerence between the employment losses of young and
old displaced workers relative to their specific non-displaced counterfactuals.
These estimates are reported in the first line of Table 3 and confirm that
the evidence of Figure 2 is robust to the inclusion of workers’ fixed eﬀects in
the specification. In the first two years after displacement the loss of the old,
in absolute value, is 3.8 percentage points larger than that of the young. This
gap then declines to become null five and six years after plant closure. Later
on, the gap changes sign denoting that the young begin to lose more than the
old relative to their counterfactual. In years nine and ten, the young lose 4.8
percentage points more than the old. We therefore conclude that this catch-
up pattern of the old displaced relative to the young continues, even when we
control for pre-displacement observable and unobservable characteristics.15
The estimates in Table 3 are based on the matched sample described in
Table 1. As we explain in Section 2, this is our preferred sample because,
thanks to the exact matching strategy that we can implement in our data, it
14Ichino et al. (2007) in Table 3 show corresponding earnings regressions, which aﬃrm
the patterns from the graphical analysis.
15The other estimates in Table 3 reveal employment patterns comparable to the ev-
idence presented in Figure 2. All displaced suﬀer from significant reductions in their
employment probabilities with substantial losses in the first two years after displacement,
which then start to decrease without completely disappearing even 10 years after displace-
ment. Moreover, all workers experience decreasing employment probabilities independent
of their displacement status with significantly larger reductions for older workers.
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improves the comparability of displaced and non-displaced workers in terms
of pre-displacement characteristics. However, using this sample, only 6,630
displaced workers (out of 12,102) can be matched with 36,777 controls out of
more than one million observations in the random control sample. A legiti-
mate worry is whether the advantage of a better comparability of displaced
and non-displaced workers at the time of potential displacement comes at a
large cost in terms of loss of observations. Such a loss not only decreases
eﬃciency, but, perhaps more importantly, makes it harder to interpret the
estimates given that it is not clear whether the matched sample is still repre-
sentative of the full population of plant closure victims. We therefore explore
how the estimates of Table 3 would change if we use all the observation in
the full sample.
Table 4 provides a direct comparison of results based on the matched
and on the full sample with and without fixed eﬀects. The first column
of this table reports, for the convenience of the reader, our preferred esti-
mates displayed in the first row of Table 3. The second column shows the
corresponding estimates in the full sample. The temporal pattern of the co-
eﬃcients is qualitatively identical: the old lose more than the young in the
first years after potential plant closure with respect to their specific counter-
factual, but later on they lose less. For our claim, this is reassuring because
it means that even using the full sample we find support for the hypothesis
that the employment losses of the old displaced are higher at the beginning
but lower later on as compared to the young displaced. Point estimates are,
however, substantially larger, in absolute value, when the full sample is used.
The diﬀerence can be due to the fact that the full sample estimates are
biased because of a worse comparability of displaced and non-displaced work-
ers, or to the fact that the matched sample is not representative of the pop-
ulation. In principle, from the viewpoint of the paper, it is irrelevant to
establish which of these two possibilities is correct, because we are primarily
interested in the temporal profile implicit in the estimated parameters, which
is the same in both specification. Nevertheless the comparison of columns 1
and 2 with columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 gives good reasons to conclude that
13
the most reliable specification should be the one based on both matching
and workers’ fixed eﬀect. This is the specification presented in Table 3 and
replicated in column 1 of Table 4.
The reason is the following: columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 report estimates
of this equation
Yi,t = Θ0(OLDi ∗ PCi ∗ Y EAR(−4, 0)i,t)
+
￿
l
Θl(OLDi ∗ PCi ∗ Y EAR(l, l + 1)i,t)
+ β0(OLDi ∗ Y EAR(−4, 0)i,t) +
￿
l
βl(OLDi ∗ Y EAR(l, l + 1)i,t)
+ γ0(PCi ∗ Y EAR(−4, 0)i,t) +
￿
l
γl(PCi ∗ Y EAR(l, l + 1)i,t)
+
￿
l
δlY EAR(l, l + 1)i,t + τt + ￿i,t (5)
which does not include workers’ fixed eﬀect. Column 3 is for the matched
sample while column 4 is for the full sample. Given the absence of fixed
eﬀects, now also the interactions with the dummy for the pre-displacement
period are included in the specification. The coeﬃcient Θ0, at the top of
the table, provides an indication of how diﬀerent the displaced and the non-
displaced workers are in the period before potential displacement. While the
coeﬃcient is significantly diﬀerent from zero in the full sample (column 4),
no important diﬀerence emerges in the matched sample (column 3), which
confirms the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1.
Interestingly, the point estimates of the other triple interaction terms
Θl are, respectively for each sample, very similar to the ones from the fixed
eﬀects model reported in columns 1 and 2 of the same table. This is expected
in the case of the estimates based on the matched sample, because matching
takes place on previous employment histories and characteristics, but might
indicate a potential problem for the estimates that are based on the full
sample. Clearly, one benefit of matching is that it immediately solves the
problem of controlling for confounding factors when the outcome is binary
(which is our case), whereas the inclusion of workers’ fixed eﬀects may not
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control suﬃciently for (time invariant) confounding factors unless one has
many pre-treatment periods. In our case we have 16 quarters before plant
closure, but due to our restriction that all workers should have at least one
year of tenure before potential displacement, the binary outcome varies only
in 12 pre-treatment quarters (years -3 and -2 before potential displacement).
Hence, the variation in the outcome that we can exploit for the fixed eﬀects
estimation might not be suﬃcient to completely eliminate any bias due to
time-invariant diﬀerences between displaced and non-displaced workers in
the full sample. This is why we regard the combination of fixed eﬀects and
matching as our preferred specification, which is the one presented in Table
3 and replicated in column 1 of Table 4.
4 Modelling employment prospects of young
and old workers after a job loss
In this section we present a job search model that allows us to interpret
the evolution of employment histories after a displacement and that helps in
understanding the diﬀerent employment experiences of old and young workers
after this kind of event.16
The basic job search model is typically used to make predictions about
the steady-state (un)employment rate of a homogenous group of workers.
The idea of our theoretical exercise is to use it, instead, to study the impli-
cations of a job loss at date t0 for the employment rates between t1 and some
later date tN . More precisely, on the basis of (i) the (constant) transition
rates from employment to unemployment and (ii) the (constant) transition
rate from employment (or unemployment) to early retirement, we calculate
the probability that a worker who gets displaced at date t0 is found in em-
16Our model implements a standard search framework that is extended by retirement
as an absorbing state. We are implicitly assuming that new workers enter continuously
the labor force and replace those who retire and study. Thus the labor market is in steady
state. For a comprehensive treatment of the basic job search framework, see for example
Mortensen (1986). See also Chemin and Wasmer (2012) for a similar exercise using ex-ante
and ex-post evaluation of a policy reform.
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ployment at each date between t1 an tN . To calculate employment losses
within an age groups, we contrast the profile of employment probabilities for
workers displaced at t0 with the corresponding profile for workers who are
not displaced at the same date. The comparison between these two poten-
tially diﬀerent profiles is the theoretical counterpart of the object of interest
of our empirical analysis in the previous sections: the diﬀerence between the
employment losses (with respect to non-displaced workers in the same age
cohort) of young and old displaced workers (i.e. the diﬀerence-in diﬀerences
eﬀect).
Thus, our theoretical exercise makes exactly the same counterfactual com-
parison that underlies our empirical analysis above: it aims at comparing the
subsequent employment probabilities of two identical individuals who diﬀer
only with respect to displacement status at date t0. One individual has lost
her job at date t0 while the other individual has retained her job at the same
date (although she may lose her job with positive probability in some later
period).
To capture a crucial institutional feature of the (European) labor market
we need to extend the simple structure of our standard search framework
allowing for the option of early retirement. In the standard model (without
a retirement option), any age diﬀerences in employment rates following a job
loss can be captured by age-diﬀerences in transition rates between two states
only: employment and unemployment. However, visual inspection of Figure
2 above shows that employment rates do not converge to a steady-state value
(as predicted by the two-state job search framework), neither for old nor for
young workers. Instead, the empirical employment rates fall monotonically
with time since displacement. This is due to attrition: workers leave the
labor force as they grow older.17
To capture this important empirical fact, we extend the basic job search
model allowing for an absorbing state which we call “early retirement”. When
the worker enters into this state, even if not old enough yet for regular re-
17Huttunen et al. (2011) also show that a significant part of workers in Norway leave
the labor force after displacement.
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tirement, she is assumed to abandon the regular labor market and to never
go back to a state of employment or unemployment. Therefore, the steady-
state concept in our augmented search model implies that in each period
some workers leave permanently the labor force while some workers enter
into it, in a way such that inflows and outflows are balanced. Within this
steady-state equilibrium, the simulation exercise described in the sequel looks
at the evolution of employment rates for particular age cohorts.
4.1 A search model with early retirement
We consider workers who, at some initial date, are either young or old and
have just experienced a displacement. The notation that distinguishes these
diﬀerent initial conditions will be introduced later. For the moment, we
focus on the period that follows this initial displacement date, in which we
assume that these workers can be in one of three states: employment E,
unemployment U , and (early) retirement R (i.e. permanent exit from the
workforce). Denoting with r the discount rate, with w the wage rate and
with p the pension-to-earnings replacement ratio, the value of retirement VR
is given by:
rVR = pw. (6)
Similarly, the values of employment VE and unemployment VU are given by:
rVE = w − e− λU(VE − VU) + λR(VR − VE) (7)
and
max
s
rVU = bw − c(s) + sµE(VE − VU) + µR(VR − VU), (8)
where e is the disutility of work, λU and λR are the transition rates from
employment to unemployment and to retirement, respectively, b is the (un-
employment) benefit-to-earnings replacement ratio, µE is the job-oﬀer arrival
rate if the worker is unemployed, and µR is the transition rate from unem-
ployment to retirement.
It is worth noting from the outset that the wage w in the above equations
will not be allowed to diﬀer by age cohort. This assumption allows us to keep
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the model simple and tractable, without making our results less general, but
it is also grounded in the evidence described in Section 2 and 3, according
to which there are no diﬀerences between the young and the old in terms of
pre- and post-displacement wages. Moreover, to solve for the optimal search
intensity, we only need to know the wage that a worker gets after a plant
closure because it is the post-plant closure wage which determines the value
of future employment VE. This is the reason why the pre-displacement wage
does not enter the equations described above. In our model, therefore, the
restrictive assumption concerning wages is only that a worker experiences an
earnings loss after the first displacement, but not after any potential future
employment change. To put it diﬀerently, our assumptions imply that after
the first (potential) displacement, which is the time origin in our setting, the
wage w is (on average over time) similarly lower for the old and the young
at each date and stays at this lower level in all future jobs.
The crucial endogenous variable is the intensity s at which unemployed
workers search for a new job. We assume that searching is costly and that
this cost is given by c(s) = As
2
2 , where A > 0 is a constant. From equation
(8), optimal search intensity, s∗, is given by
As∗ = µE(VE − VU). (9)
This equation says that the marginal cost of searching (i.e. the left hand
side) has to equal the marginal benefit (i.e. the right hand side), which is
the expected increase in income from a successful search. The system of
four equations, (6), (7), (8) and (9), in the four unknowns s∗, VR, VE, and
VU defines the equilibrium. We can reduce the above system to a single
(quadratic) equation which implicitly determines the optimal search intensity
s∗:
As∗ = µE
w − e− bw + As∗22 + λR−µRr+µR
￿
w(p− b) + As∗22
￿
r + λU + λR +
￿
r+λR
r+µR
￿
s∗µE
 (10)
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4.2 Age diﬀerences in employment prospect after dis-
placement.
The model presented above allows us to characterize possible explanations of
the employment patterns that we have described in Section 3 for displaced
and non-displaced workers of diﬀerent ages. We focus specifically on three
possible sets of explanations, which we find most interesting.
First, young and old workers may face diﬀerent labor demand conditions.
For example, old unemployed workers may get fewer job oﬀers, in which case
µoldE < µ
young
E ; or face a higher risk of job loss if employed, in which case
λoldU > λ
young
U ; or both. Note that our model predicts that these diﬀeren-
tial demand conditions will be partly accommodated by workers’ responses
in terms of search intensity s∗. Our goal is to show under which assump-
tions these endogenous workers’ reactions in terms of search intensity can be
disentangled from demand conditions as well as from other determinants of
supply.
A second explanation of the observed age-diﬀerences in employment pat-
terns after a job loss refers to workers’ incentives. Old unemployed workers
may have a lower incentive to (search hard for) work, either because work-
ing is more costly for them, in which case eold > eyoung, or because their
search costs are higher, in which case Aold > Ayoung. In both cases we would
expect that, because of these two reasons related to supply behavior, old
workers, once displaced, will have lower employment rates than displaced
young workers.
A third explanation looks at institutional determinants of labor supply.
Old workers face better options to enter early retirement, both from employ-
ment and unemployment. In terms of the model parameters, this implies
that λoldR > λ
young
R , and µ
old
R > µ
young
R , respectively. Note again that these
age-diﬀerences in exogenous parameters will be accommodated (and possi-
bly intensified) by the search behavior of young and old workers. Institutional
diﬀerences may also arise because of more generous unemployment insurance
for older workers and/or more generous early retirement benefits for workers
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who have contributed to the system for a longer period of time.18
Our goal, now, is to compare the observed employment patterns, de-
scribed in Section 3, with those that are simulated by the model under
diﬀerent parameter configurations in order to identify which one of these
configurations is more likely to have generated the data.
4.3 A “minimum distance” calibration for the most
likely configuration of parameters
The model presented above produces the following system of diﬀerence equa-
tions that describe the evolution of employment of young and old workers,
respectively.
Ejt = (1− λjR − λjU)Ejt−1 + µ˜jEU jt−1
U jt = λ
j
UEt−1 + (1− µjR − µ˜jE)U jt−1
, (11)
where j￿ {young, old} and the eﬀective arrival rate of job oﬀers is µ˜jE = sjµjE;
therefore note that the model cannot disentangle directly the arrival rate
of job oﬀers that are created for the unemployed (µjE) from their search
intensity (sj), a problem we will deal with later. Moreover within each age
group, displaced and non-displaced workers follow the same dynamics. This
reproduces the maintained hypothesis, which is at the basis of the matching
estimation strategy implemented in Section 3, according to which displaced
workers are randomly selected from the overall population (conditioning on
observables) and any diﬀerence between the two groups is caused by the
event of displacement only. In other words, displaced and non-displaced
workers diﬀer only because of their initial conditions of employment or non-
employment at the time of plant closure. Therefore, at date t = 0, when the
event of plant closure takes place, we set Ej0 = 0 and U
j
0 = 1 for the displaced
and Ej0 = 1 and U
j
0 = 0 for the non-displaced.
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18See the Appendix for institutional details on retirement and early retirement schemes
in Austria.
19Note that the parameters of the dynamic system (11) do not diﬀer by displacement
status. This restriction make sense for µjR and µ˜
j
E , because, in a stationary environment,
it is reasonable that the exit rates from unemployment are the same for those who were
recently displaced and for those who will experience displacement in the future. It is
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In matrix notation, the above system (11) of diﬀerence equations can be
written as Yjt = ΦY
j
t−1, where Y
j
t =
￿
Ejt , U
j
t
￿￿
and Φ is the 2x2 matrix
of the system parameters, that are in turn functions of the primitive model
parameters λjR,λ
j
U , µ
j
R, and µ˜
j
E. The solution to this system is straightforward
and given by
Yjt = Φ
jYj0.
To calibrate the parameters of the model (λjR,λ
j
U , µ
j
R, and µ˜
j
E) we proceed
as follows. We choose the parameter values that (i) obey the above system of
diﬀerence equations and (ii) minimize the distance between the observed and
the calibrated employment patterns. The goal of this calibration strategy is
to generate predicted time paths that match the evolution of employment
rates (and of the diﬀerences between these rates) that we have described in
Figure 2 for the four groups defined by age cohort and displacement status. In
particular, we want to explore which parameter values are able to replicate
the remarkable catch-up behavior of old workers: i.e. that in the first five
years they suﬀer more from a plant closure as compared to the young, while
after five years this pattern turns around.
Formally, given these goals, we look for the parameter values λjR,λ
j
U , µ
j
R,
and µ˜jE that minimize the following objective function:
Ω =
32￿
t=1
(Ey,npct − Eˆy,npct )2 +
32￿
t=1
(Ey,pct − Eˆy,pct )2
+
32￿
t=1
(Eo,npct − Eˆo,npct )2 +
32￿
t=1
(Eo,pct − Eˆo,pct )2
+
32￿
t=1
(Uy,npct − Uˆy,npct )2 +
32￿
t=1
(Uy,pct − Uˆy,pct )2
instead restrictive to assume that the exit rates from employment λjR and λ
j
U are the same
independently of a recent displacement event. This because it is plausible that recently
displaced workers who found a new job face a higher risk of being dismissed. We plan to
relax this restrictive assumption in future work, but it is remarkable, as we will see, that
even with this restriction the employment histories predicted by the model match very
closely those observed in the data.
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+
32￿
t=1
(U o,npct − Uˆ o,npct )2 +
32￿
t=1
(U o,pct − Uˆ o,pct )2. (12)
Note that this objective function is the sum of two parts: The first part is
the sum of the squared distances between the observed (Et) and the simulated
(Eˆt) employment rates in the four groups of workers (by age cohort and
plant closure status) for which we have data: old displaced (o,pc), old non-
displaced (o,npc), young displaced (y,pc), young non-displaced (y,npc). The
second part is the sum of the squared distances between the simulated and
the observed unemployment rates across the four groups. This reproduces
the dynamic paths of all three states: employment, unemployment and – as
a residual – the retirement state.
In order to properly distinguish unemployment from retirement (which in
our context is defined as a permanent exit from the labour force), we proceed
as follows: we count a worker as a permanent dropout (a “retiree”) if she/he
exits from employment in a given quarter and remains not employed for all
the remaining quarters of our observation period. Since the exits observed
towards the end of the period could be temporary even if lasting until quarter
40, we run the simulation until quarter 32, so that at least 8 quarters of non-
employment are necessary to classify a worker as permanently dropout.
The minimization of the objective function (12) yields the calibrated pa-
rameters reported in Table 5. Before commenting on these parameter values,
however, it is important to show, in Figure 4, that they generate simulated
patterns that fit the observed ones very well. This close correspondence
emerges not only for the levels of the employment rates, by displacement
status of the young and the old (in the top Panels of the figure), but also for
the diﬀerences (in the bottom left Panel) and for the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
(in the bottom right Panel).
Looking specifically at this last panel, the calibrated values indicate that
the old displaced lose up to 3 percent more than the young displaced (relative
to their respective counterfactuals), in the first five years after displacement.
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The corresponding maximum loss observed in the actual data is just slightly
higher, at 5 percent. Moreover, the model and the data coincide quite closely
in showing that, after the fifth year from plant closure, the old displaced
begin to gain with respect to the young displaced (relative to their respective
counterfactuals). In other words, the minimum distance calibration of the
parameters is capable to capture fairly well the finding that, after the fifth
year, the old catch up with the young regain what they have lost in the first
five years.
As far as the employment levels are concerned, the model’s predictions
for the young workers, both displaced and non-displaced, match quite well
what we see in the data (left upper panel of Figure 4). The employment
rates of older workers are also predicted quite well, though somewhat less
precisely than those for younger workers (right upper panel of Figure 4).
One feature that the model does not capture well enough for old workers is
the concavity of the employment profile over time as observed in the data,
that suggests increasing rather than constant transition rates to retirement
with increasing age; a fact which cannot be dealt with in our simple time-
invariant specification.
All in all, the minimum distance calibration of the search model’s param-
eters, displayed in Table 5, does surprisingly well in predicting the employ-
ment prospects of the old and the young workers who are displaced in a plant
closure as well as the analogous prospects of their non-displaced counterfac-
tuals. Hence, we can now turn with confidence to the interpretation of the
calibrated parameters displayed in Table 5, in order to understand whether
supply or demand factors are more likely to have driven the observed pat-
terns.
4.4 What drives the employment prospect of young
and old workers
The first column of Table 5 reports the calibration of λu, which is the transi-
tion rate from employment to unemployment or, in other words, the instan-
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taneous probability of layoﬀ. For the old this parameter is calibrated to be
fairly low, at a rate of 1.7% per quarter, while for the young it is almost twice
as high at a level of 2.6% per quarter. This is in line with the international
evidence oﬀered by Kuhn (2002), who finds a lower displacement risk for
elderly workers in many countries. It is actually not surprising if we consider
that “First - in - last - out” seniority rules govern layoﬀs in many Austrian
(and continental European) companies.
The second column of the Table reports the calibrated transition rates
from employment to (early) retirement, which are measured by the parameter
λr. In this case, the ranking of the parameters for the young and the old is
inverted. As expected, this instantaneous probability is zero for the young
who have very limited opportunities to access early retirement. It is instead
quite large (1.9%) for the old who, in Austria like in other European countries,
can typically use many channels to leave work and receive an early pension
income.20
This diﬀerential pattern of early retirement opportunities for the young
and the old is confirmed as well by the calibration of the parameter µr,
which measures the transition rate from unemployment into the absorbing
state that we have labelled “early retirement”, in which the worker remains
out of the labor force, possibly receiving an early pension income (Column 3
of Table 5). For both young and old workers, the probability of a transition
to retirement is higher from unemployment (µr > λr). While for the young
µr = 0.08 (8.0% per quarter), for the old it reaches the high level of 13.7%
per quarter, which indicates that for an unemployed worker in Austria, par-
ticularly if old but also if young, feasible opportunities to exit the work force
permanently are easier to grab than for an employed worker.21 This is not
surprising given the strong reactions that unemployment typically generates
in the public opinion, particularly in the case of old citizens22, inducing gov-
20Note that the total exit rate from employment (λu + λr) is much higher for old than
for young workers (3.6% vs. 2.6%).
21See also Tatsiramos (2010) who finds that displaced older workers in Spain and Ger-
many frequently enter early retirement, but less so in Italy or the U.K.
22See again footnote 1
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ernments to put in place schemes that oﬀer to unemployed, but still active,
workers easier and more generous possibilities of transition into early retire-
ment, sometimes through intermediate periods of “protected joblessness.23
Looking together at the three parameters analyzed so far, demand factors
do not seem to be the most important ones for an explanation of the more
adverse employment prospects observed for older workers in the first five
years after displacement. If anything, they push in the opposite direction.
On the one hand, the rate λu at which old workers lose their job, provided
they have one, is fairly low, while it is almost twice as big for the young. On
the other hand, the old have much larger opportunities to retire (µr and λr)
than the young, particularly if they are unemployed. Thus, more accessible
retirement opportunities for the old, seem, if anything, to be more relevant
for an explanation of the observed patterns, although it is not clear to what
extent they are driven by supply factors only – e.g. generous retirement
incentives – or whether demand factors might play a role as well. This could
happen, for example, if these retirement schemes make it easier for firms to
get rid of their most expensive unwanted workers, as suggested by Hakola
and Uusitalo (2005) and Frimmel et al. (2013). But also in this case the
responsibility would fall on public policies aimed at creating incentives to
early retirement which would display their eﬀects through demand as well as
through supply.
The remaining parameter µ˜e in Table 5 is, however, the one on which
most attention in the public opinion is typically focused. This is the eﬀective
arrival rate of job oﬀers to unemployed workers, which results from the inter-
action between their search intensity and the job creation activity of firms.
Interestingly, the calibration of this parameter (Column 4) delivers figures
that are remarkably similar for the young and the old. The instantaneous
probability of a transition from unemployment to employment is equal to
0.419 for a young unemployed worker and is only slightly smaller (0.416) for
an old unemployed worker.
23The Appendix gives some institutional evidence on these schemes for Austria.
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It should be remembered, though, that µ˜e = sµe. In other words, what
our calibration procedure can pin down is just the product of the search
intensity s and the arrival rate of new oﬀers from companies µe. Therefore, on
the basis of this product µ˜e, one cannot immediately jump to the conclusion
that the young and the old unemployed have the same working opportunities
simply because µ˜e is equal. In order to answer this question we need an
estimate for job search intensity by age.
Well accepted and clear-cut empirical indicators of search intensity are
diﬃcult to define and find, since search eﬀort is a multi-faceted and hard-
to-measure concept. Therefore, we use a combination of questions from the
2002, 2004 and 2006 waves of the Austrian Microcensus; all these surveys
have exactly the same questions on job search behavior. Taking the three
surveys together we come up with 812 unemployed individuals in the age
group 35-55; 391 of them young and 423 old.
The survey asks detailed questions about job search methods, including
whether the intermediation by the employment oﬃce was requested or not.
In total, respondents can chose one or more of the following eight job search
methods. Three involve the intermediation of the employment oﬃce: to visit
personally the employment oﬃce, to study job oﬀers there, to visit a firm
with the help of the employment oﬃce. Five more methods do not involve
the employment oﬃce intermediation: to read newspaper advertisements,
to inquire with friends and acquaintances, to call firms, to send application
letters, to visit a firm. On the basis of the respondents’ choices concerning
these methods, we constructed two indicators of job search intensity: a)
the average number of search methods that a person has been using (search
depth) and b) the percentage of persons who have used at least one search
method (search width).
Results suggest unambiguously that both search intensity measures de-
crease with age. As far as search depth is concerned, the young unemployed,
use on average 2.72 of the available search methods relative to an average
of 2.19 for the unemployed old ones. The diﬀerence is statistically signifi-
cant with a t-value of 3.38. As far as search width is concerned, 72.4% of
26
young unemployed workers are active searchers, i.e. they use at least one
method, as compared to 61.9% of the old. Also this diﬀerence is statistically
significant with a t-value of 3.18. These diﬀerential search patterns by age
cohort are also confirmed by the answers to another question of the survey.
When respondents have to say whether they are “currently looking for a job”
the answer is aﬃrmative for 81.5% of the young unemployed while the same
is true for only 68.4% of the old unemployed (the diﬀerence is statistically
significant with a t-value of 4.14).24
This evidence suggests unambiguously that sold < syoung, i.e. the old
search less intensively than the young. Since the minimum distance calibra-
tion indicates that
µ˜olde ≡ soldµolde ≈ syoungµyounge ≡ µ˜younge (13)
the inequality of search intensity by age cohort must imply that
µolde ≥ µyounge (14)
i.e. that the arrival rate of job oﬀers to the old unemployed is unlikely to be
smaller, and most probably larger, than the respective arrival rate for the
young.
Figure 5 shows from another angle how relevant retirement incentives are
likely to be in explaining the observed employment patterns after a displace-
ment. The figure reports the “real data” and the “calibrated” relative em-
ployment losses of old versus young workers – i.e. the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
patterns plotted in panels D of Figures 2 and 4 respectively – side by side
with two “counterfactual” simulations of these relative employment losses.
Counterfactual 1 sets transition rates of the old between the states of
employment and unemployment equal to the corresponding calibrated rates
24Likewise, Eriksson et al. (2002) show that job search intensity – whether measured
in the number of search methods used or the hours per week spent – is lower for workers
above 50 relative to younger ones in Finland, Denmark and Norway. Krueger and Mueller
(2012) show – using time use data for six countries - that the time spent in job search is
decreasing after age 30, while in the US the maximum is reached for the age group 46-50
(Aguiar et al. (2013))
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for the young. This counterfactual shuts down the possibility that diﬀerences
in layoﬀ rates and in the arrival of job oﬀers for young and old workers might
explain the observed patterns of relative employment losses, but leaves open
the other channels of explanation. In this case, the counterfactual pattern
is qualitatively very similar to the calibrated and the real data patterns,
suggesting that diﬀerences between young and old workers in layoﬀ rates
and job oﬀer arrival rates cannot explain why the relative employment losses
of old workers after a displacement are initially larger and later smaller than
those of young workers.
Counterfactual 2, instead, sets the transition rates into retirement of the
old equal to the corresponding rates for the young. This counterfactual
shuts down the possibility that diﬀerences in retirement opportunities of
young and old workers explain the patterns of relative employment losses,
but leaves open the other channels of explanation. In this case, it is evident
that the counterfactual pattern is completely diﬀerent from the observed
and the calibrated ones, being flat and close to zero. This suggests that, in
the absence of diﬀerences in retiring opportunities between young and old
workers, we would not see the evolution of relative employment losses that
are instead observed in the real data as well as those that can be calibrated
within our theoretical model
To conclude, the analysis of the minimum distance calibration of the
model parameters, joined with independent evidence on search behaviour,
suggests that retirement incentives rather than factors aﬀecting transitions
between unemployment and employment (in both directions) are responsible
for the observed patterns of relative employment losses of old versus young
workers after a displacement. The old seem to face a smaller firing probabil-
ity if employed and a higher job arrival rate if unemployed. They also enjoy
significantly higher opportunities to take up early retirement schemes, partic-
ularly when unemployed. As a result of this configuration of parameters, the
old search less intensively for new working opportunities, when unemployed,
both in terms of search depth (number of search methods used) and search
width (probability of being an active searcher).
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we provided fresh evidence on two questions that are the object
of a hot debate in the aging European society: are there significant diﬀerences
in the employment prospects of old and young workers, particularly when
they lose their job? And, if these diﬀerences exist, what are their driving
forces?
To answer the first question we have used representative data from the
Austrian administrative records that allow us to study the employment his-
tories of old (45-55 years of age) and young (35-45 years of age) workers who
have lost their job due to an exogenous event – a plant closure –, comparing
them to a control sample of non-displaced workers who were matched accord-
ing to a host of pre-plant closure characteristics. This comparison suggests
that, over the long term time horizon of ten years after plant closure, the
old displaced do not have, overall, worse employment opportunities than the
young displaced, relative to their respective non-displaced counterfactuals.
However, this long term absence of diﬀerences hides more diversified and
puzzling short term patterns. In the first five years after plant closure the
old displaced experience significantly higher losses than the young, with re-
spect to the counterfactuals, but regain completely the lost terrain in the
subsequent five years.
To interpret these findings and thus answer the second question, we set
up a standard job search model and extend it by allowing for an absorbing
state that captures the option of “early retirement”, defined as a situation
of permanent exit from the workforce. Using a simple minimum distance
algorithm to calibrate the transition parameters, we find that the model does
remarkably well in replicating the observed employment patterns not only in
terms of levels for each group but also in terms of diﬀerences and diﬀerences
between diﬀerences across the four groups. We conclude that our framework
provides a helpful tool to explore the reasons of the observed diﬀerential
consequences of job displacement between older and younger workers.
The analysis strongly suggests that retirement incentives are mainly re-
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sponsible for the observed employment patterns. Old workers do not face a
higher probability of layoﬀ if employed, nor a lower arrival rate of job oﬀers
if unemployed. They instead face a higher probability of a transition to early
retirement in particular when they are unemployed. Independent evidence
from the Austrian Micro Census further suggests that search intensity for new
working opportunities is significantly lower among older unemployed work-
ers, probably because for them the exogenous arrival rate of new job oﬀers
is not lower and the opportunities of early retirement are more attractive.
From a policy perspective, our paper suggests that measures aimed at
bringing older unemployed workers back to work after a displacement, such
as specifically targeted training programs and/or incentives for firms to hire
older unemplpoyed workers, should substitute early retirement schemes with
possible savings for public finances.
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Appendix: The pension and unemployment in-
surance system in Austria
Austria has a fairly generous pay-as-you-go pension system which allows
fairly early retirement options. The regular pension can be claimed at age
65 for men and 60 for women provided they paid contributions for at least
180 months. If the individual has worked for more than 420 months, early
retirement due to “suﬃcient insurance contributions” is possible.25 Apart
from these general rules, long-term unemployment allowed retirement at age
60 (55) for men (women) if the person was unemployed for at least 52 weeks
in the last 15 months.
Although the regular retirement age is similar to that in other European
countries, the actual retirement age of men decreased steadily from nearly
62 in the 1970s to about 58 in 1995. Since then, it has increased slightly to
around 59 years since 2005. Despite the diﬀerent statutory retirement age
for men and women, the actual retirement age for women is less than half a
year lower than the one for males (Hofer and Koman, 2006).
Early retirement due to reduced working capacity was possible in the
1990s for men and women after age 55. This option requires that the claimant
– due to health reasons – could not continue the work predominantly pursued
in the last 15 years. A similar case is an invalidity pension, which could be
claimed, in principle, at any age, but oﬀers only a considerably lower pension.
For both alternatives, a doctor has to check whether or not the applicant has
reduced working capacity.
The formula for calculating old-age pension levels is based on the retire-
ment age, the number of insurance years and the level of income prior to the
time of retirement. In the case of the normal old-age pension at the statu-
tory retirement age, the best 5-15 years of earnings (below a certain upper
contribution cap) are used to calculate the basis of assessment (Hofer and
Koman, 2006). In the eighties the five best years of earnings were used only,
which was later on extended.
25These rules are shown for the 1980s. In 1992 the unequal retirement age for men and
women was abolished, which will take eﬀect only for women born after 1963.
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Until 1989, an unemployed person could draw regular unemployment ben-
efits for a maximum period of 30 weeks provided that he or she had paid
unemployment insurance contributions for at least 156 weeks within the last
5 years. In August 1989 the potential duration of these payments became
dependent on age. Benefit duration for the age group 40-49 was increased
to 39 weeks if the unemployed has been employed 312 weeks within the last
10 years prior to the current spell. For the age group 50 and older, benefit
duration was increased to 52 weeks if the unemployed has been employed
for at least 468 weeks within the last 15 years. After 1988 – after a severe
steel crises – in certain regions of the country, benefit duration for workers
50 years of age and older was extended to 209 weeks provided they had long
contribution periods.26
26See Winter-Ebmer (1998) or Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004) for an analysis of these
benefit extensions. In Table 6 Ichino et al. (2007) show that these benefit extensions do
not dominate the main pattern of our empirical analysis.
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Figure 1: Relative Diﬀerence in average pre-displacement wages between
treated and matched controls
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pairwise relative distance in percent of average wages in Q(−8,−11)
35−44 45−55
Kernel density estimates
Note: Kernel density estimates of the “within match” relative diﬀerence in average pre-
closure wages between displaced workers and their matched controls, performed separately
for old and young workers. The “within match” relative diﬀerence in average pre-closure
wages is measured in percent of average wages in the quarters 8 to 11 prior to potential
plant closure.
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Table 2: The Eﬀect of Plant Closure on Future Employment
All Male Female
OLD*PC*POST 0.000 0.006 –0.007
(0.010) (0.014) (0.015)
OLD*POST –0.274*** –0.203*** –0.350***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
PC*POST –0.154*** –0.140*** –0.169***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
POST –0.094*** –0.096*** –0.092***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.980*** 0.985*** 0.974***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 2,465,250 1,420,497 1,044,753
R2 0.479 0.456 0.499
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Note: Estimates based on equation 2. The dependent variable is a dummy for the employ-
ment status of the worker. All specifications include individual fixed eﬀects and calendar
time eﬀects. Estimation results are based on the matched sample. Clustered standard
errors at the individual level in parentheses.
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Table 3: Fixed eﬀects estimates
Years after Potential Displacement
1 - 2 3 - 4 5 - 6 7 - 8 9 - 10
OLD*PC*YEAR -.038 -.034 .000 .026 .048
(.010)∗∗ (.012)∗∗ (.013) (.013)∗ (.013)∗∗
PC*YEAR -.273 -.154 -.130 -.107 -.101
(.006)∗∗ (.007)∗∗ (.007)∗∗ (.008)∗∗ (.008)∗∗
OLD*YEAR -.047 -.141 -.265 -.396 -.514
(.004)∗∗ (.006)∗∗ (.007)∗∗ (.007)∗∗ (.007)∗∗
YEAR -.026 -.069 -.106 -.149 -.195
(.002)∗∗ (.003)∗∗ (.005)∗∗ (.006)∗∗ (.007)∗∗
Note: Estimates based on equation 4. The dependent variable is a dummy for the em-
ployment status of the worker. The specification includes individual fixed eﬀects, calendar
time eﬀects and a constant term (.939∗∗). Estimation results are based on the matched
sample with 2,465,250 worker-quarter observations. The R2 equals .543 and the F statistic
equals 317.4. Clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses.
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Table 4: Matched versus random control sample
with FE without FE
Matched Full Matched Full
OLD*PC*YEAR(-4-0) .002 .009
(.002) (.002)∗∗
OLD*PC*YEAR(1-2) -.038 -.067 -.036 -.063
(.01)∗∗ (.007)∗∗ (.010)∗∗ (.007)∗∗
OLD*PC*YEAR(3-4) -.034 -.070 -.032 -.065
(.012)∗∗ (.009)∗∗ (.012)∗∗ (.008)∗∗
OLD*PC*YEAR(5-6) .000 -.012 .001 -.007
(.013) (.009) (.013) (.009)
OLD*PC*YEAR(7-8) .026 .036 .028 .040
(.013)∗ (.009)∗∗ (.013)∗ (.009)∗∗
OLD*PC*YEAR(9-10) .048 .072 .05 .067
(.013)∗∗ (.009)∗∗ (.012)∗∗ (.008)∗∗
Fixed eﬀects yes yes no no
Observations 2,465,250 2,759,256 2,465,250 2,759,256
R2 .543 .551 .259 .286
F statistic 317.403 730.448 290.368 735.716
Note: Estimation results in columns 1 and 2 are based on equation 4, columns 3 and 4
report results based on equation 5. The dependent variable is a dummy for the employment
status of the worker. Only the triple interaction terms are reported. All specifications
include calendar time eﬀects. Columns 1 and 3 report estimation results based on the
matched sample, column 2 and 4 report results based on the full sample. Clustered
standard errors at the individual level in parentheses.
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Table 5: Minimum distance calibration of the model’s parameters
λu λr µr µ˜e
Young workers 0.026 0.0 0.080 0.419
Old workers 0.017 0.019 0.137 0.416
Sum of squares: 0.1707
Note: The table reports the configuration of parameters in model (11)
Ejt = (1− λjR − λjU )Ejt−1 + µ˜jEUjt−1
Ujt = λ
j
UEt−1 + (1− µjR − µ˜jE)Ujt−1
,
which minimizes the objective function
Ω =
32￿
t=1
(Ey,npct − Eˆy,npct )2 +
32￿
t=1
(Ey,pct − Eˆy,pct )2 +
32￿
t=1
(Eo,npct − Eˆo,npct )2 +
32￿
t=1
(Eo,pct − Eˆo,pct )2
+
32￿
t=1
(Uy,npct − Uˆy,npct )2 +
32￿
t=1
(Uy,pct − Uˆy,pct )2 +
32￿
t=1
(Uo,npct − Uˆo,npct )2 +
32￿
t=1
(Uo,pct − Uˆo,pct )2.
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Figure 5: Comparison between, real data, calibrated and counterfactual rel-
ative employment losses of old versus young workers after a displacement
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Note: The figure reports the “real data” and the “calibrated” relative employment losses of old versus
young workers – i.e. the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence patterns plotted in panels D of Figures 2 and 4 respectively
– together with two “counterfactual” simulations of these relative employment losses.
Counterfactual 1 sets transition rates of the old between the states of employment and unemployment
equal to the corresponding calibrated rates for the young. This counterfactual shuts down the possibility
that diﬀerences in layoﬀ rates and in the arrival of job oﬀers for young and old workers might explain the
patterns of relative employment losses, but leaves open the other channels of explanation.
Counterfactual 2 sets the transition rates into retirements of the old equal to the corresponding rates for
the young. This counterfactual shuts down the possibility that diﬀerences in retirement opportunities
of young and old workers explain the patterns of relative employment losses, but leaves open the other
channels of explanation.
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